Conférence donnée par Philip Pettit dans le cadre du colloque "Minds in Common", organisé par Mattia Gallotti (Jean Nicod Institute) et John Michael (Copenhagen University and University of Aarhus).
Might any plausible laws of social science imply that our folk psychology of individual mentality is misconceived (as distinct just from being mistaken on various matters)? Are our social relationships essential in a constitutive rather than a merely causal way to how we are minded? And are the group agents we form for various purposes capable of having minds of their own? These three questions about mind and society, which are at the core of concerns in social ontology, are often confused with one another, despite being logically independent. This paper attempts to provide a map of the terrain in which they arise.
Catégories: Minds in Common
Mot-clés : société, psychologie, loi, nature, individualisme, ontologie
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Princeton University & Australian National University
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Philip Noel Pettit est un philosophe irlandais et un théoricien politique. Il est professeur de politique et valeurs morales à l'Université de Princeton.
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