En octobre et novembre 2014, l’Institut Jean Nicod du département d’études cognitives, a reçu Imogen Dickie de l’Université de Toronto, pour une série de 6 conférences portant sur la thématique "Thought's anchor: reference as a cognitive achievement".
I shall develop an account of how the relations to ordinary objects that enable us to think about them do their aboutness-fixing work. The account is built around two foundational claims. The first captures the significance for accounts of aboutness of the fact that justification is truth conducive. The second concerns why we are in the business of thinking about particular things at all: I shall argue that we are in this business because the mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself. I shall explain and defend these claims in the first two lectures. Then I shall use them to give accounts of aboutness-fixing for perceptual demonstrative thoughts, proper-name-based thoughts, and descriptive thoughts. In the last lecture I shall use the framework to provide a new defence of the traditional claim that there can be no thought without subjective consciousness.
Exposé 1 – Introduction and proof of the aboutness and justification principle.
Imogen Dickie est professeur associée au département de philosophie à l’Université de Toronto.Cliquer ICI pour fermer
Dernière mise à jour : 29/01/2015